Most executive agreements were concluded in accordance with a treaty or an act of Congress. However, presidents have sometimes reached executive agreements to achieve goals that would not find the support of two-thirds of the Senate. For example, after the outbreak of World War II, but before the Americans entered the conflict, President Franklin D. Roosevelt negotiated an executive agreement that gave the United Kingdom 50 obsolete destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases on some British naval bases in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that there is certainly no difference between treaties and ex post-Congress executive agreements. Failure to reject the zero hypothesis differs from the evidence of the zero hypothesis. The number of ex post executive agreements in the sample is small. Therefore, the failure to reject the zero hypothesis may be due simply to large standard errors due to data scarcity. This is especially true for models (2) (5), which include a large number of covariates, resulting in data savings in many subgroups. The fact that almost all model specifications provide negative coefficients certainly allows a larger number of data to obtain a statistically significant difference, although a small one. At the same time, anecdotal evidence also provides alternative explanations for plausibility. Consider, for example, the negotiation process for arms reduction agreements between the United States and Russia. During the SALT II negotiations, the United States proposed an interim agreement between Congress and the Executive to ban new types of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
However, former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrej Gromyko rejected the proposal because of the allegedly lower status of the agreement between Congress and the executive branch. Footnote 12 Similarly, the United States and Russia agreed during negotiations on the Strategic Offensive Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) to reduce their active nuclear warhead arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 each. President Putin insisted that the agreement be coded as a formal treaty and gave up considerable bargaining power to convince President Bush, who supports an agreement between Congress and the executive branch. Footnote 13 Outside the context of nuclear disarmament, negotiators also drew attention to the treaty as a desired form of more serious engagement.