A: In the United States, when we work in environmental justice litigation in the southeastern United States and, for example, you have a poor community of colors that pollutes a hundred fortune companies that disproportionately pollutes that neighborhood nearby, and they work a good neighborhood agreement in principle through some sort ad hoc negotiation. Neighbours are never convinced that this company will actually make the emission reductions they have promised for several years or that they will achieve by investing the community reduction or compensation benefits they have promised. The fact that there is a written agreement that all lawyers have had, that it is the United States, that officials sat around the table without refuting, inevitably raises concerns about the implementation of these informally negotiated agreements. So what we`ve learned is to build what are called “almost self-forced agreements.” I would say that it would be as dear to my concern in a brown field of mediation in a city in the northeastern United States as it is in Manila, if we go to Mendenov and worry about their global mining interests and we do not promise the Muslim minority on that island. An almost self-forced agreement, what makes an almost self-forced agreement? First, that all contingencies are defined in the agreement, so that not everything stops completely if the step one after another is not followed exactly by step two of the second part, because the conditions have changed. “Oh and it wasn`t spelled, so I can`t imagine doing what I said I would,” and then it all falls apart. But if, even in the unlikely circumstances, I leave, this second step still involves it, but if it happens, two steps change. The more contingencies you express in the agreement, the more likely it is that the agreement will be imposed on itself. Second, if I include monitoring in the agreement, so there is a neutral monitor that calls the second page and says, “It`s your turn, they`ve done step 1.” You may not think they did stage 1, but I`m saying they did the first step, and now it`s your turn to do step two. They are putting in place a neutral monitoring of the agreement in order to obtain the probability that it is necessary. And the most important thing is that you ask both parties to install a stake that they would sacrifice if they don`t do what they promised. So if you say, “I`m going to install it, and I promise you it won`t diminish any of your neighbor`s real estate values, wait.” Then they say, “I don`t want you to build it.
I`m too worried. You say, “No, no, no, it won`t hurt you.” “Okay, buy me real estate insurance for the next 10 years. Guarantee me that the value of my home will rise to all real estate after your construction. Otherwise, I sell my house and dive into this insurance. “Well, isn`t there a minute you don`t really expect you to ask me to buy this insurance?” “Well, you tell me you don`t have to spend it. You tell me not to worry, to keep me unscathed. “Well, do I have all my capital that I invested in politics at the end of the last ten years?” “Yes, with interest. It`s in a bank account. But I have no risk. An almost self-imposed agreement. Q: If the option of non-agreement for the government or company is to act with impunity, will they do so? The traditional doctrine of contract law seems to follow this distinction. One of the fundamental principles of the right to contact is the requirement for clarity. An agreement is not applied as a contract if it is uncertain and materially undetermined.