Agoa Agreement South Africa

Although AGOA has been extended twice, the last time until 2025, it has been threatened over the past four years due to tariffs on major steel and aluminum products and the suspension of duty-free access to clothing imports from Rwanda. Any further disruption to AGOA could devastate the region, particularly in the medium and long term, as economies seek to recover from the effects of COVID-19. Related Content Focus on Africa The United States and Kenya are entering into a free trade agreement. Will they succeed? Witney Schneidman and Brionne Dawson Wednesday, July 29, 2020 Future Development Two ASEAN lessons for regional integration in Africa Souleymane Coulibaly Wednesday, 29 July 2020 Africa focuses on trade in times of uncertainty: prioritizing the region through global value chains to accelerate economic development in East Africa Andrew Mold and Anthony Mveyange Wednesday 15 April 2020 Second , the 2015 law creates a system of structural disorganization between the United States and sub-Sahara. This involves using a tariff preference program to improve market access in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the new legislation will allow the USTR to act in support of any lobby group in the United States that seeks to promote its economic interests in these markets when these lobbies are encouraged by a certain economic policy (trade or investment measures such as intellectual or local content, environment, labor) of the country or trade agreements signed by the country with a third country. , to be aggrieved. Such an aggrieved party may ask the President to take action against such a country by threatening to withdraw or suspend AGOA benefits or withdraw it altogether from AGOA. This provision of the 2015 Act is likely to be used by some U.S. interests and the USTR will be under pressure to deal with such threats (the U.S. poultry industry has managed to exert such pressure on South Africa). Thus, the new law introduced in the new AGOA a system of “structural wear” that risks creating increased tensions in sub-Saharan relations instead of deepening cooperation. There is no doubt that African countries will have to take into account the cost of this wear and tear and uncertainty about their trade and investments with the United States, and many will look at new emerging countries to support their development projects and programs, where reciprocity requirements are not as severe or aggressive.

While the USTR has the “right” to use these new powers under the new legislation, it must ensure that it uses these new “flexibilities” granted to it by the new law prudently and sensitively, while being aware of their potential consequences. Another important element of the 2015 Act, which is based primarily on the provision already contained in the 2000 Act, is the principle of reciprocity. The 2015 law states that U.S. policy is to “deepen and develop trade and investment relations between sub-Saharan Africa and the United States,” including negotiating “agreements with individual sub-Saharan countries”… Regional economic communities and the promotion of “full implementation of WTO commitments.”